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With the help of a theoretical model we analyze the relation between equity 
sharing in an international joint venture (EJV) and local public goods provision in a 
setting where the local government faces a commitment problem to provide public 
services ex post to the set-up of the firm. We show that to overcome such a dual 
agency problem, the multinational leaves more local rents to the local partner than 
in the first-best, so as to provide stronger incentives for the government to supply 
public goods. Applying dynamic panel data estimation, we test the trade-off between 
local public goods and ownership shares across 31 Chinese provinces to find support 
for our mechanism 
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  1. Introduction 
 
A key issue for multinational firms is the degree of authority over their foreign 
ventures.  Clearly, full  ownership makes the firm claimant on all of the foreign 
venture's profits. However, the  transaction costs theory (Williamson 1985), 
the property rights literature (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990), as 
well as the managerial incentives literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) argues 
that when activities of the subsidiary's managers are imperfectly contractible, equity 
sharing reduces moral hazard  and hold-up (Chi 1994; Pisano 1989). In addition, 
empirical research shows that sharing profits with local management 
stimulates  innovation and makes them  cooperate in transferring knowledge (for 
example Chen and Hennart 2004).  
Another feature of equity joint ventures (EJV) is that profit sharing preserves 
incentives for government assistance, which adds to the institutional resource base of 
the joint venture (Parkhe 1993; Luo 2001).
1 When local managers have a larger share 
in the joint venture, they are better motivated to act as linking pins between foreign 
investors and local government, so as to use their connections to improve the 
profitability of the venture (Shan 1991). In this spirit,  Chari and Chang (2009) 
demonstrate that cultural distance between the home and host country has a positive 
effect on incentives for local managers. For China, Lee, Chen, and Kao (1998) show 
that when the local partner in the EJV is connected to the local government, the level 
of its equity ownership is higher.  Moreover, many case studies on EJVs 
find a negative effect of foreign equity shares on local government involvement in 
creating the right business atmosphere (for example Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Luo 
2001; Root 1988; Yan and Gray 1994).       
 In this paper, we study the relationship between equity shares and local public 
goods provision in China. We start by setting up a theoretical model to study how 
contracts between foreign and domestic  partners  deal with limited incentives for 
public  officials. In a principal-agent  relationship between the foreign  investor  (the 
principal) and the local partner (the agent), the local government acts as a dual agent 
whose ex post actions cannot be contracted directly. However, since  the future 
revenues  of the local private partner affect the  government's  incentives to provide 
                                                 
1  In China, foreign direct investments (FDI) have moved from mainly equity joint ventures to 
predominantly fully owned foreign owned subsidiaries. public goods, in the venture stage leaving more rents to the local partner  (partly) 
solves the commitment problem. We then extend the model to include free riding 
among foreign investors in a common agency setting and the effects of minimum 
local equity shares on profits and welfare. After that, we present empirical evidence 
for China on the interaction between local equity shares and public goods provision 
by applying dynamic panel estimation with two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. 
In line with our theoretical predictions on public incentives, infrastructural services 
across Chinese provinces increase with the level of local equity ownership in foreign 
funded enterprises (FFE). Moreover, a negative impact of the number of FFEs on 
local equity shares implies the presence of free riding, which is shown to exert a 
negative externality on public goods provision.  
 China is justified as an interesting case to study. First, China attracts much 
FDI, so we are able to observe dynamic effects.  However, China  has not fully 
transited into a market economy, so that the role of local government is important in 
attracting FDI. In addition, the large heterogeneity in the quality of local governments 
is suggested to be a critical determinant for equity sharing in EJV (Lee, Chen, and 
Kao 1998;  Zhao and Zhu 1998), and has important effects on the geographical 
distribution of FDI across Chinese provinces (Cole, Elliott, and Zhang 2006; Cheung 
and Lin 2004; Fu 2008).  
Government commitment is a common theme in the international trade 
literature, for example in setting tariffs and export taxes. Our paper is close to the 
spirit of Tirole (2003), who analyzes the commitment problem of governments in 
international finance. He shows that ex ante inefficient taxes on capital inflows may 
serve as an ex post efficient commitment devise for good domestic policies. His (and 
our) result echoes older and more general findings in the common agency literature 
that restrictions on the agent’s behaviour may improve efficiency by alleviating the 
common pool problem, see for example Bernheim and Whinston (1997).  
 
2. The Theoretical Model 
 
Consider the unit production of a final good z for which the price in the world market 
depends on the quality of the inputs. Production takes place in a partnership between a 
final goods producer and a specialized component producer. In line with most of the literature, suppose that there are two private inputs: the quality of headquarter services 
h and that of the component m. In addition production needs a public input a into the 
production process. We assume that the revenues of selling z are R = R(x) where R(x) 
is the vector of inputs. R(x) is strictly concave in all its arguments, all third derivatives 
are close to zero, and the inputs m, h, and a are complementary to each other and that 
the mixed second-order derivatives (Rmh, Rma, and Rha) are close to zero.
2 The costs to 
supply quality of each input are captured by a convex cost function C(x). Clearly, the 
first-best is a forcing contract on the quality of the inputs that maximizes profits П = 
R(x) - ∑C(x) with the first-order conditions Rx = Cx.  
 
2.1 The basic model 
 
The set up of our model is an equity joint venture (EJV) where quality of the inputs is 
non-contractible so that incentives have to be provided.
3 The foreign firm is the senior 
partner in the EJV and (as principal) has to decide on the equity (1-β) share it will 
take. Hence, the pay-offs for the foreign and the domestic firms in the EJV are: 
         
(,. ) ( 1 )(,,) ( )
h mha Rmha Ch                                                                   (1) 
(,. ) (,,) ()
m mha Rmha Cm                                                                        (2) 
 
The local government’s objective function maximizes the pay-off of the local supplier 
subject to the social costs of public investment: 
 
(,,) () () GR m h a C m C a                                                                            (3) 
 
                                                 
2 The same assumption is applied in Anderson (2009). 
3  There may be various reasons to consider this set up. For example, the quality depends on 
unobservable effort and cannot be verified before the final sale. Then, a contract cannot specify the 
quality of the input nor effort and relies on tying the rewards of the input producer to total revenues. It 
may also capture the case where there is some uncertainty in the contracting stage how high the price 
will be in the world market for a given quality. Also in that situation it may be optimal to design a 
bonus scheme that relates rewards of the input producer to the revenues in the world market when the 
input suppliers have observed the price-quality relation before they maximize profits. Further, when 
renegotiation is possible in the stage when the inputs have to be put together, then forcing contracts 
may simply not be credible. Lastly, forcing contracts may give rise to well-known multiple equilibria 
when financial sanctions are non-enforceable. The timing of events is as follows. In stage 1 the foreign partner in the EJV decides on 
the equity share β for the local supplier; In stage 2 the government decides on the 
level of public investment a; In stage 3 the firms set production levels h and m and 
share the profits according to the equity shares. We solve for subgame-prefect 
equilibria.  In stage 3, the firms choose h and m. The first-order conditions for 
choosing the optimal quality of inputs are: 
 
(1 ) ( , , ) ( ) 0 hh Rm h a Ch                                                                              (4) 
(,,) () 0 mm Rm h a Cm                                                                                   (5) 
 
It is evident that both firms under invest in quality compared to the first-best, in line 
with Holmstrom (1982), who shows that in the absence of side-payments or third 
party enforcements first-best incentives cannot be implemented, since they break the 
budget constraint. We can show that 
** 0, 0 dm d dh d    and 
** 0, 0 dm da dh da  , so that public investment may have a direct effect on 
revenues, but also increase the marginal returns to the private inputs.
4 
In stage 2, the government realizes that public investment will increase the 
revenues of both partners in the EJV, but it only cares for those of the local firm. 
Hence, it sets public investments to satisfy: 
 
*** *** (,,) (* )(,,) 0 ah dG da R m h a dh da R m h a C    a 
                                                
                         (6)                               
 
When compared to the first-best public investment Ra = Ca, the first part of (6) 
indicates underinvestment in public goods when β < 1. The second term shows that 
(to some extend) such weak incentives for public investment are mitigated by the fact 
that the government wants to induce higher investment from the foreign producer, so 
as to increase the profits of the local supplier. It is straightforward to show that da
*/dβ 
> 0, which means that increasing β gives the local supplier a higher share in the 
profits and, hence, its government a stronger incentive to provide public goods.
5 
 
4 Proofs in this paper are available upon request. 
5 An interesting side-result is that an unbiased social planner would conduct a higher level of public 
investment than the first-best level when the team structure of production provides too weak incentives 
for the firms. Such a social planner would maximize:  (,,) () ( ) () GR m h aC mC hC a   . As the In the first stage, there is a trade-off for the foreign firm. Increasing incentives 
for the component producer increases the supplier's quality of which he also benefits. 
However, these stronger incentives induce higher payment to the component supplier, 
which puts a dent in the profits of the final goods producer. In the first stage the final 
goods producer chooses incentives β so as to maximize his own profits. The optimal β 
maximizes equation (1), which (using the envelope theorem) gives: 
 
*** * * ***
* * *** * * * ***
(,,) ( 1 ) ( )(,,)
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Equation (7) reveals that four arguments explain why the commitment problem forces 
incentives for the local supplier to be strong. Before we go over the arguments, 
recognize that investments in m, h, and a are higher when no commitment problem is 
present and so are returns R. The first term of equation (7) shows that revenues R are 
lower than in the absence of government commitment, so that giving incentives at the 
margin is less costly. By the second term, when the provision of m, h, and a is lower 
due to the commitment problem, the marginal productivity of the local supplier is 
higher, which raises the rewards of providing incentives. The third term is positive 
and shows that the final goods producer has an incentive to push the government to 
increase public investment, which in turn increases the revenues of the foreign 
producer. Lastly, the fourth (positive) term reveals that more local rents further raise 
the investment of the local supplier through the increased public goods investment. 
Intuitively, since the government only cares for the local supplier’s benefits, 
leaving more rents to the local supplier also generates incentives for the local 
government to invest in public goods. The two-fold gains from stronger incentives for 
both the local supplier and government increase the total revenues and the payoffs to 
the foreign producer. Hence, when public goods are insufficient because of high 
opportunity costs, the foreign producer would like to stimulate public investment by 
giving the local supplier more rents. With some assumptions ( mh R ,  hm R , β
2, (1-β)
2, 
and β(1-β) are sufficiently small; both producers have the same revenues and costs 
                                                                                                                                            
envelope theorem does not apply, this gives: dG () ( ) 0 mm hh aa RC RC RC da dm da dh da        
Since the last two terms are positive, incentives for investing public goods may be higher than in the 
first-best case. structure , mm hh aa mm hh aa R RR C CC  ), solving for the optimal incentives in 










m a mm mm mm mm
ma m m ma m
RRR CR C R




   m
                     (8) 
 
Equation (8) implies some critical factors which determine the optimal rents left for 
the local partner. First, local equity shares increase when local intermediate inputs and 
public goods are more important for the joint production (
** 0, 0 ma RR     ). 
Second, with a concave revenues function, more local rents β
* will be provided when 
the decreases of the marginal returns to local inputs (m or a) are smaller 
(
* 0 mm R    ). Third, higher revenues mean a larger direct loss from sharing rents 
and therefore lead to weaker local incentives (
** 0 R   ). Government 
commitment results in larger marginal gains of local inputs (Rm and Ra) and lower 
revenues (R
*), compared to the first-best case, and hence raises local rents.  
 
2.2 Free Riding 
 
From the perspective of country incentives, a common agency problem emerges. 
Actually, the common agency problem is a translation of the dual agency problem 
from the side of firms’ managerial choices to the local government’s behavior. 
Suppose that N foreign firms engage in international team production. In this case the 
local government is a common agency of all production teams to provide non-rival 
and non-excludable public goods. The optimal level of public investment depends on 
the overall incentives offered by all firms. Yet, at least some foreign producers intend 
to provide weak incentives for the local suppliers, because they can free ride on public 
goods generated by other foreign producers’ shared rents. When the local government 
only cares about local suppliers’ benefits, however, it invests less in public goods 
given lowered local profits. In other words, common agency and free riding result in 
dual moral hazard of both the local government and the foreign firms, which cause 
under provision of public goods and under provision of incentives for the local firms. 
Negative externalities of common agency and free riding give rise to production 
efficiency loss. Therefore, when the public goods are so scarce, foreign firms have motivation to encourage the local government to improve the level of public 
investment.  
Suppose that there are N equity joint ventures. In stage 3 all EJVs choose the 
optima
a 
                                                          
(9) 




i given the incentive structure. In stage 2 the 
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Given the equity shares of other firmsβj (j ≠ i), the change of public investment 
                                                       (1
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In stage 1 the foreign firms decide on their own local rents left for the local producers 
d
based on profits maximization: 
 
** * * * * * (1 )( ) (1 )( ) 0
h
ii i i i i i ii ma dd R d m d R d a d R                       (12) 
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In equation (13), R
*
m represents the marginal returns to local inputs in the singe-firm 
case. Keeping other parameters constant, local shares decrease with the number of 
foreign investors when multinationals free ride on public incentives. This is an 
important result, because recent empirical research indicates that EJVs are replaced by fully foreign owned production facilities (Branstetter and Lardy 2007). The argument 
in this paper is that when the number of foreign firms in China increases, this gives 
the individual investor less incentive for profit sharing.   
Totally differentiating equation (10) and applying symmetry in equilibrium, 
we find: 
 




aa i i aa
Rd h d R da
dd N N







]                                                    (14) 
 
Equation  (14) represents the negative externalities from free riding. Local rents 
diminish with the opportunistic behaviour among foreign firms ( 0 i dd N   ), which 
in turn discourage the local government in public investmen ally, the 
positive second-order derivative of a with respect to N corresponds to a non-linear 
relation supported by the empirical evidence.  
 
t. Addition
.3 Local Content Requirements 




that the local government provides a minimum level of public goods. In this case 
leaving more local rents to encourage local public investment will increase the profits 
for both local and foreign producers. Compared to the total revenues with zero local 
public investment (





i R R  ) under the condition below: 
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Intuitively, when the local government realizes that foreign firms are free riding, it 
reduces local public investment. With many foreign investors and when public goods 
are very important for production, the request for local content requirements can 
increase the total revenues of the joint production and therefore the profits of foreign 
firms.  
 2.4 Hypotheses 
ased on this simple model, in the next section we test the following hypotheses: 
eaker 
incentives to
gion results in free riding and, hence, in 
lower l
. Empirical Evidence 
o test the relation between equity sharing and public incentives, we use aggregated 
.1 Econometric Model 




H1: High levels of local ownership result in high levels of public goods. 
H2:  When levels of public goods increase, foreign firms have w
 leave rents to domestic firms. 
H3: More foreign firms within a re





data for foreign funded enterprises (FFE) across 31 Chinese provinces between 1995 
and 2006. Data are from Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1995-2007) published by the 
Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. Entry modes of multinationals in China can be 
classified into contractual joint ventures, cooperative ventures, and fully foreign 
funded enterprises. Equity sharing is captured by the ratio of local capital in total 
registered capital of FFE. In addition, we have data on the total number of FFEs and 
their investment level at provincial level. We measure local economic development by 
provincial GDP per capital and local public goods by a provincial infrastructural 
factor derived from variables on transportation and communication, which include 
length of city roads, area of city road, capacity of freight, length of railways, length of 
highways, length of inland waterways, capacity of telephone exchanges (long-
distance, local, and mobile phone), and length of cable lines. Tables 1 and 2 present 






Publ 11 1 2
12 1
it it it it
it it it it









  [1] 
 L 11 22 1
22 1 2 1
it it it it
it it it it
ocalshares Localshares Localshares Publicgoods











The dependent variable in the econometric model [1] is the level of public goods 
blem when 
foreign
ll the level variables are integrated 
at ord
represented by local infrastructure and CV represents control variables. A dynamic 
setting is needed, since public goods provision is usually persistent over time. To 
account for autocorrelation, lag one is selected based on t-statistics. A positive 
α1  indicates that local governments invest more in infrastructure with more local 
shares, which therefore shows the presence of the commitment problem.  
Model [2] illustrates a possible solution to the commitment pro
 investors take into account the role of local governments in equity sharing. To 
capture the dynamics of local rents, the optimal order of the lag length is selected to 
be two. Previous rather than the contemporary level of public goods is interesting 
because in equity sharing stage foreign investors are not acknowledged of the level of 
public goods ex post provided by local governments in our theoretical model. Hence, 
the existing level of public goods is used as a referenced baseline. If investors are 
satisfied with the existing level of infrastructure, zero γ1 and γ2 are expected because 
the commitment problem is not relevant in this case. However, if the accessible public 
goods are insufficient, negative γ1 and γ2 mean that foreign firms provide local rents to 
stimulate local governments in public investment. 
Panel unit roots tests in Table 3 show that a
er one and first differencing yields stationary series. Meanwhile, first 
differencing helps to eliminate regional specific time-invariant characteristics. 
Therefore, the econometrics models are in  first-differenced form. Since the first-
differenced lagged dependent variables are endogenous by specification, lagged two 
level variables are used as instrumental variables, as proposed by Anderson and Hsiao 








 Levels  First  Differences 
Variables  Obs.  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Obs.  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Localshares  369  0.3586 0.0978 0.1111 0.5524  338  -0.0110 0.0456 -0.1870 0.3333 
Publicgoods  371  -0.0303 0.9896 -1.3168 4.5063 340 0.0705  0.1711  -0.5413  0.9982 
GRPPC (ln)  369  8.9721 0.6709 7.3479  10.9629  338  0.1335 0.0982 -0.1227 0.4880 
FFE total investment (ln)  369 13.9207  1.5716  9.5670  17.2937 338 0.0937  0.4444  -3.1559  3.3195 








 Levels  First  Differences 
Variables  Localshares Publicgoods GRPPC Investment Number Localshares Publicgoods GRPPC Investment Number 
Localshares  1.0000         1.0000        
Publicgoods  -0.3620  1.0000      -0.1016  1.0000     
GRPPC (ln)  -0.6121  0.6218  1.0000     0.0420  0.0891  1.0000    
investment (ln)  -0.5628 0.7476  0.6877  1.0000    -0.1526 0.0628  0.0680  1.0000   
Number of FFE  -0.4692 0.7300  0.4943  0.7373  1.0000  -0.0801 0.4179  0.1573  0.4028  1.0000  
Table 3 
 
Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
 Level  First  differences 
Variables p-value  Order  p-value  Order 
Localshares  0.0000  I (1)  0.8298  I (0) 
Publicgoods  0.0000  I (1)  0.3928  I (0) 
GRPPC (ln)  0.0000  I (1)  0.4534   I (0) 
FFE investment (ln)  0.0000  I (1)  0.9965  I (0) 
Number of FFE (ln)  0.0000  I (1)  0.9989  I (0) 
 
Note: the null hypothesis of Hadrilm test (with Heteroskedastic error) is that all time series in the panel are 
stationary processes.  
 
3.2 Estimation Results 
 
The first four columns in Table 4 show the results of estimating the model [1]. Across 
panels, the impact of equity sharing on public goods provision is statistically 
significant positive. In the dynamic setting, local governments raise the infrastructural 
factor by 0.20 percentage points if foreign investors leave one percent more rents for 
their local partners. Regression results of the model [2] in Column (5) imply that 
foreign investors strategically respond to public goods provision. In provinces with 
one unit lower infrastructural factor, foreign investors share 4.9 percent more rents 
with local partners. When more public goods are needed (e.g. the level of the existing 
infrastructure is low), the results indicate that foreign investors deal with the 
commitment problem by offering stronger incentives. In addition, the significant 
negative impact of the number of FFEs on equity sharing suggests free riding among 
foreign investors.  
The overall impact of the number of firms on public investment is shown in 
Column (1). When more FFEs are established, local governments expect more local 
rents, which act as incentives to supply public goods. Without raised local rents 
(keeping local rents constant), the benefits of involving more FDI are marginal. 
Therefore, a failure to realize the local governments’ expectation results in weakened 
public incentives. More importantly, free riding reduces public incentives and 
therefore leads to an indirect effect of the number of FFEs on public goods through 
lower equity sharing. The specific effect of free riding is obtained by comparing 
results in Columns (1) and (3). If  we control for local shares in Column (3), the 
12 difference between the magnitudes of the number of FFEs variable in Columns (1) 
and (3) can be viewed as the effect free riding on public incentives.  
Furthermore, a turning point of increasing investing firms is supported by the 
positive squared terms in Columns (2) and (4). The negative externalities of free 
riding can be internalized when foreign investors realize the efficiency loss and 
increase local rents. When the level of public goods hits the bottom due to free riding, 
at least some of the foreign investors may stand out to alleviate the inefficiency. 
Alternatively, local governments may exert local content requirements. With a 
minimum amount of local rents requested, foreign investors have obligation in sharing 





Dynamic Panel Estimation Results (2SLS) 
 
  Model [1]  Model [2] 
Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
∆Publicgoods-1  0.952*** 0.937*** 0.955*** 0.941*** 0.012
  (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.025)
∆Publicgoods-2   -0.044*
   (0.024)
∆Localshares  0.209* 0.200* 
  (0.118) (0.117) 
∆Localshares-1  0.042 0.035 0.174
  (0.144) (0.143) (0.333)
∆Localshares-2   0.099
   (0.167)
Number of FFEs (ln)  -0.071** -0.045 -0.062** -0.038 -0.102*
  (0.029) (0.041) (0.027) (0.039) (0.060)
∆Number squared  0.013 0.012 
  (0.010) (0.009) 
∆GRPPC (ln)  0.338** 0.340** 0.336** 0.338** 0.039
  (0.145) (0.146) (0.147) (0.148) (0.039)
∆GRPPC-1  -0.065 -0.060 -0.069 -0.064 -0.013
  (0.167) (0.166) (0.170) (0.169) (0.052)
∆Investment (ln)  0.092*** 0.078** 0.087*** 0.075** 0.046
  (0.029) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.055)
∆Iinvestment-1  -0.006 -0.011 -0.004 -0.009 -0.011
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)  (0.012)
   
IV first-stage (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0063
Test H0: Exogeneity  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000
Joint significance  0.0047 0.0044 
No. of observations  308 308 308 308  276
 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Significance level 1% ***, 5% **, and 10% *. Regression 
controls for year dummy. Since provinces may interact with each other, standard errors are corrected 
for cross-provincial (spatial) and temporal dependence. Robustness tests show that contemporary 
variable is insignificant in column (5). 
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4. Concluding Comments 
 
This paper has investigated the dual and common agency problems in international 
investment strategies of multinational firms. So far, papers that discuss the interaction 
between the headquarter firm and the production facility have taken government 
behaviour as given. This is an important omission, since the role of the (local) 
government is a potential critical source of the contract imperfection. We model such 
a contract imperfection explicitly by introducing a dual agency problem. We show 
that the headquarter firm may leave more rents for the production facility’s 
management to induce its government to behave well. Although it is difficult to 
isolate these effects in a macro-political environment, we do present some evidence 
for China on the trade-off between foreign rents and local government incentives. 
By endogenizing government behaviour we may speculate on an additional set 
of results when the model is slightly enriched. First, we have set up the model in the 
managerial incentives tradition, which highlights the moral hazard problem in 
production. Alternatively, we may consider a set up where re-negotiation takes place 
after the initial production stage. We are confident that such a set up would not alter 
the basic intuitions presented in the present paper. Moreover, is such a setting we may 
model government effort as enforcement of private contracts. In that case an 
intriguing result arises in that the local government may strategically under invest in 
the rule of law, so as to induce higher rents for the domestic firm. 
What we have not done is to make the now standard connection to the 
literature on firm heterogeneity. As is well known, differences in firm productivity 
may cause differences in internationalization strategy. Clearly, taking up government 
incentives may affect the choice over FDI or outsourcing. To speculate, it may well be 
that the dual agency problem inflicts a bias towards outsourcing. The reason is that 
outsourcing contracts – in contrast to FDI - can easily be cancelled in the short run, so 
that they discipline the government in providing public goods. 
Our model on equity sharing may also capture the incentives brought about by 
knowledge sharing and knowledge transfer EJVs. Often, local government is more 
interested in such transfers than in profits of local firms. For example, to take 
advantage of low labour costs, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) has set up various 
14 production plants across China. In order to get government supports in local 
production, AMD has an interest in maintaining a good relationship with the Chinese 
government. This means that AMD sometimes has to do things which may run against 
its short run interest. As a case in point, with respect to AMD’s research cooperation 
with one Chinese local computer chip producer, an AMD general manager points out: 
“This is a potential competitor for AMD, but we are still doing that... This is the 
commitment of AMD to the Chinese government. If you want to do business here in 
China, you have to grow with China together”. 
Lastly, our discussion on local content requirements may open up to a broader 
discussion on the merit if trade barriers. For example, Ornelas and Turner (2008) 
investigate the effects of trade protection when firms enter in imperfect contracts. 
They show that when tariffs increase the rewards to domestic factors of production, 
they may also raise the rents to domestic firms in vertical relationships, and for that 
reason may increase social welfare. For this reason, in our set up a government may 
strategically raise trade barriers so as to credibly commit to good policies and hence 
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